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Since its inception in 1988, al-Qaeda’s ideological narrative has been a major factor in its 
ability to mobilize resources, gain new recruits, and garner support from the broader 
Muslim community. In its nearly three decades of existence, the global jihadi group has 
experienced great structural change and periods of social upheaval. From the Global War 
on Terror that weakened the organization’s central leadership to the events of the Arab 
Spring that exposed the unpopularity of the group’s ideological beliefs, al-Qaeda has 
remained resilient. Today, al-Qaeda’s ideology is arguably its most important tool in its 
struggle against adversaries. This thesis analyzes al-Qaeda’s public statements from its 
birth in Afghanistan to the present and tracks the changes in the group’s framing 
practices. This thesis argues that al-Qaeda’s central leadership has remained relevant and 
ensured its own survival by exploiting new opportunities and adjusting its public 
messaging campaign to accommodate changing strategic environments. The analysis of 
al-Qaeda’s framing practices is important because the organization remains a major 
global security threat and its ideology and public messaging has contributed to the 
group’s survival. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF AL-QAEDA MESSAGE FRAMING 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the turn of the 21 century, the United States and its allies have been 
engaged in a battle against Muslim extremists who adhere to a global or transnational 
jihadi ideology. The global jihad movement, or the struggle against perceived external 
aggression toward the Muslim world, primarily directs its rhetoric and attacks against 
foreign enemies who support corrupt domestic regimes.1 This relatively modern 
movement is associated closely with al Qaeda and in the past fifteen years the United 
States has worked to strategically deny this organization resources, political 
opportunities, and safe havens.2 Combatting the global jihad ideology has taken a less 
prominent role however. It was not until the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 that 
popular public support for democratic transition offered a viable counter-ideological 
narrative to that posed by al Qaeda. Much has been written of the Arab Spring’s promise 
to defeat Islamist global jihadi movements. Yet those movements are still alive and well. 
How has the Arab Spring affected global jihadism? Has the framing of prominent 
transnational jihadi movements changed as a result of the Arab Spring and its aftermath; 
if so, how?  
Prior to the popular uprisings that toppled longstanding leaders in Egypt, Libya, 
and Tunisia, al-Qaeda and its affiliates consistently framed global jihad as the only viable 
strategy to depose corrupt domestic regimes.3 With the initial success of these relatively 
non-violent protests, al-Qaeda’s ideology appeared to be counterfactual; furthermore, 
popular public support for democratic elections appeared to affirm that there was little 
desire for a unified Islamic State under the direction of a caliphate. Because jihad against 
                                                 
1 “What is Jihadism?” BBC News, December 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
30411519 
2 Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in is Third Decade: Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory? 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), vii, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/ 
2012/RAND_OP362.pdf 
3 Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi, “Jihadi Discourse in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” 
Combating Terrorism Center (2013), 5, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/CTC-
Jihadi-Discourse-in-the-Wake-of-the-Arab-Spring-December2013.pdf. 
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the “far enemy”—i.e., the United States—is such a central tenet to the al-Qaeda 
movement, it is imperative to analyze the public statements and actions of the group’s 
leadership to determine if they have attempted to re-frame their ideology to remain 
relevant in a post-Arab Spring environment, when change close to home became 
possible. If al-Qaeda has altered its framing, has such change contributed to the group’s 
survival or is it a product of other factors taking place in the region? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 1996, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden declared a defensive jihad against the 
United States and its allies.4 His core grievances revolved around U.S. support for Israel, 
Western military presence in Saudi Arabia, and the international sanctions leveled against 
Iraq.5 Bin Laden carefully framed his message in religious parlance that portrayed the 
United States as a crusader army that was directly attacking the ummah and supporting 
corrupt leaders in the heart of the Muslim world.6 His rhetoric turned to action with the 
bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, the attack against the USS Cole in 2000, 
and the coordinated strikes against the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001.7 These 
events propelled the United States and its allies into the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 
which ultimately led them into protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to 
these conventional wars, the desire to eradicate the threat of global jihad has also largely 
defined U.S. foreign policy and domestic security initiatives since 2001. The United 
States and its allies have framed transnational terrorism as one of the first great struggles 
of the 21st century and therefore is a relevant field of study. 
In combating al-Qaeda, the United States has focused a great amount of resources 
on depriving the group of support networks, financial resources, and safe havens. In 
addition to strikes directed at the organization’s leadership, these initiatives have largely 
been effective in disrupting al-Qaeda’s ability to centrally plan and control complex 
                                                 
4 Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, CRS Report No. RL32759 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005): 2, http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32759.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Blanchard, Statements and Evolving Ideology, 3. 
7 Ibid., 3–4. 
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attacks against Western targets.8 One area on which the United States has focused less 
attention is discrediting the transnational jihadi ideological narrative. Despite the nearly 
complete dismantling of the central al-Qaeda leadership structure, its affiliate groups still 
operate with impunity throughout the Middle East and North Africa.9 Although these 
groups are largely autonomous and receive little guidance or support from a central 
command, they still operate under the banner of the al-Qaeda brand and justify actions 
according to the teachings and proclamations of bin Laden and his successor, Ayman al-
Zawahiri. For many radical groups, al-Qaeda’s ideological message still resonates and 
motivates them to action despite having only loose ties with their parent organization. 
The United States has been effective in limiting al-Qaeda’s opportunity structures 
and its ability to mobilize resources, but has failed to significantly degrade its message 
framing processes. In social movement theory, the framing process is a key component, 
alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity for recruitment, sustainment, 
and the ability to pursue group objectives.10 Al-Qaeda’s enduring ability to frame its 
ideology so that it still strongly resonates with its affiliates, would-be recruits, and 
segments of broader Muslim society is key to the group’s survival and the survival of the 
global jihadi philosophy. 
Al-Qaeda’s ability to ensure its belief system’s long-term survival is predicated 
on winning the framing contest with rival ideological competitors. Whether the 
competitors are democratic governments, Islamic clerics, or rival jihadi networks, al-
Qaeda must assert enough authority in the ideological realm to continue to maintain a 
support base or it may face eventual extinction. The events of the Arab Spring left al-
Qaeda with its first significant challenge to maintaining relevance and ideological 
authority. The popular social movements in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia stunned the entire 
world, including the al-Qaeda leadership, who had no hand in forcing the removal of 
long-standing regimes in those countries. The popular outcry for democratic elections 
                                                 
8 Jenkins, Al Qaeda in its Third Decade. 
9 Ibid., viii. 
10 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Process and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611, http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611. 
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further alienated al-Qaeda from the sentiments of the broader population and many 
analysts believed that this would effectively be the end of al-Qaeda and global jihadi 
ideology in general.11 
The prediction that al-Qaeda and global jihad would perish with the political 
revolutions of the Arab Spring now appears to have been a gross miscalculation by 
academics and analysts alike. The power vacuum that materialized with the fall of several 
autocratic regimes and the ongoing violence in Syria and Iraq have created fertile ground 
for al-Qaeda and other newly formed jihadi groups to operate.12 This thesis analyzes al-
Qaeda’s message framing before, during, and after the events of the Arab Spring to 
determine if it attempted to re-frame its ideological positions and if this had any bearing 
on the group’s survival during this tumultuous period. This study may also have 
implications on the future prominence of the global jihadi organizations and the ideology 
that compels them to action. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Global Jihadi Ideology and the Rise of Al-Qaeda 
There is a plethora of literature on the formation of global jihadi ideology and the 
history of the groups that subscribe to its principles. There are multiple interpretations of 
the meaning of jihad that are bitterly contested in the Muslim world today, but Islamic 
jurists and theological scholars have historically defined jihad as the mandatory collective 
struggle for Muslims to wage war against polytheists or those who threaten Islam.13 
Adherents to the global jihadi ideology have departed from this traditional framework 
and redefined jihad as an individual external struggle that all Muslims must undertake 
against enemies both foreign and domestic.14 For the purposes of this thesis I will focus 
primarily on the core principles that make the global jihad unique from other radical 
Islamist groups. The Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb is often credited with inspiring the 
                                                 
11 Lahoud and al-‘Ubaydi, “Jihad Discourse,” 6. 
12 Ibid., 18. 
13 Daniel W. Brown, A New Introduction to Islam, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 
164. 
14 Ibid., 269. 
 5 
global jihadi movement in the modern era. His seminal work, In the Shade of the Qur’an, 
is the basis for the ideological arguments global jihadi groups use to this day. Qutb 
emphasized the application of jihad in the pursuit of an Islamic society as it is defined in 
the Qur’an.15 Qutb’s sphere of influence in not limited only to radical jihadi groups. His 
writings have influenced many other popular Islamist movements and his reputation is 
held in high regard throughout many segments of the Muslim population. Because Qutb’s 
teachings carry such great authority, al-Qaeda frequently invokes his works in order to 
bolster its own legitimacy and capitalize on the power of his reputation.16 This is a 
message framing technique that global jihadi groups employ often.  
Middle Eastern affairs analyst Christopher Blanchard argues that global jihadi 
ideology can be categorized into three core foundations.17 The first foundation is “the 
Quran-Based Authority to Govern,” which includes the creation of an Islamic State and 
the implementation of Sharia Law.18 This principle foundation is also opposed to any 
system of governance that is “deemed contrary to Islamic faith.”19 The second foundation 
is “the liberation of the homelands.”20 This principle includes the belief that the far 
enemy must be defeated before Muslims are able to take control of their own domestic 
affairs and implement an Islamic State.21 The far enemy is defined as governments or 
organizations outside of the Muslim world that support corrupt domestic regimes and 
oppress the ummah (Muslim community).22 This belief is largely unique to the global 
jihadi ideology and, because they have made many successful attacks against foreign 
                                                 
15 Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: 
Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 149. 
16 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Struggle 
for Sacred Authority,” in Popular Intellectuals and Social Movements: Framing Protest in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America, ed. Michiel Baud and Rosanne Rutten (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 168. 





22 Mary Habeck, “Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror,” John Hopkins 
University, February 15, 2006, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives06spring/habeck.html 
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states, these groups are of special interest to Western analysts and scholars. The final 
foundation in the global jihadi ideology is “the liberation of the human being.”23 This 
principle concerns the “contractual social relationship between Muslims and their rulers 
that would permit people to choose and criticize their leaders but also demand the 
Muslims resist and overthrow rulers who violate Islamic laws and principles.”24 This 
thesis will further explore the more nuanced aspects that make global jihadi ideology 
distinct from other belief systems, demonstrate how al-Qaeda employs these ideas 
through its message framing processes, and how it responded to framing and ideology 
arising in the Arab Spring. 
There are extensive volumes of literature devoted to the formation of al-Qaeda 
and other global jihadi groups that have emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. The 
scope of this thesis does not necessitate a detailed examination of the rise of al-Qaeda and 
the methods, in which the organization were able to grow and carry out its attacks, but it 
is important to give a brief explanation of the group’s history as it pertains to its ideology 
and framing practices. The group is a product of the Mujahedeen (protectors of the 
Muslim faith)25 resistance that withstood the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 
1980s.26 This resistance movement was framed as a defensive jihad against infidel forces 
and it attracted many young men from all over the Muslim world.27 One of those fighters, 
Osama bin Laden, would carry the lessons he had learned in the Afghanistan campaign 
and expand jihadi operations to other areas of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Al-Qaeda was officially established in 1988, and since that time it has engaged 
in multiple campaigns against Western targets that it had identified as the far enemy.28 
Bin Laden began to focus much of his operations against U.S. targets due to America’s 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 7. 
25 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “mujahideen,” accessed April 27, 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1523091/mujahideen. 
26 James Defronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
2007), 336. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, viii. 
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participation in the Gulf war in the 1990s and its continued presence in Saudi Arabia.29 
Bin Laden viewed U.S. presence in the Muslim holy land as an affront to God, and 
believed America’s influence over regional affairs was corrupting Muslim governments. 
In response, al-Qaeda made multiple attacks against U.S. embassies, and military targets, 
as well as the devastating coordinated assault on the World Trade Towers and 
Pentagon.30 
2. Framing Theory and Global Jihadi Ideology 
This thesis is based largely on the presentation and analysis of public statements 
from prominent global jihadi organizations. It therefore places great importance on 
framing theory and collective action frames that fall within the broader study of social 
movements. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow argue that research in social 
movement theory has traditionally revolved around political opportunity and resource 
mobilization.31 Perhaps not uncoincidentally, the United States had sought to degrade 
these same areas in its global war on transnational terrorism. 
Political opportunity and resource mobilization are undoubtedly important factors 
in the foundation and survival of global jihadi groups like al-Qaeda; much research and 
analysis has been focused on this phenomenon, but less attention has been paid to its 
ideological framing practices. Snow and Benford argue that researchers tend to “ignore or 
gloss over mobilizing beliefs and ideas” due to “their presumed ubiquity and constancy, 
which make them, in turn, relatively non-problematic and uninteresting factors in the 
movement equation.”32 Within the last decade, however, there has been a sharp increase 
in the study of “collective action frames and framing processes in relation to social 
                                                 
29 Defronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 336. 
30 Ibid., 338. 
31 Benford and Snow, “Framing Process,” 611. 
32 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol Mclurg Mueller (Binghamton, NY: Yale 
University, 1992), 135. 
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movements”33 and many sociologists now believe that framing processes are “a central 
dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements.”34 
Like other social movements, global jihadi organizations utilize frames in order to 
simplify world events and give them significance in a way that mobilizes individuals and 
furthers the group’s agenda.35 Quintan Wiktorowicz has written extensively on the 
framing practices of global jihadi organizations, especially as they apply to ideological 
contests with competing groups. He argues that, by their nature, global jihadi 
organizations are relatively small movements and their radical ideology is not widely 
accepted by the broader population.36 Because the global jihadi belief system is 
diametrically opposed to most other ideologies, they are essentially in a framing contest 
with numerous and very diverse competitors. Global jihadi groups face framing 
competition from non-violent Salafi scholars, domestic regimes, Western governments, 
and rival jihadi organizations. They are under siege from all directions and, being that 
they rely heavily on their ideology to mobilize support, it becomes imperative for them to 
take great care in their message framing processes. 
Wiktorowicz argues that there are four main framing strategies that global jihadi 
groups utilize to assert their authority in the ideological realm: “vilification” and 
“discrediting” of their opponents and the “exaltation” and “credentialing” of their own 
leaders and ideals.37 In the struggle for authority, these groups must endeavor to establish 
credibility if they are to have successful framing campaigns. If leaders are not perceived 
as honest, intellectual, and above reproach, the resonance of their message can be lost.38 
In the process of group framing it is also important to draw stark parallels between 
different movements. This is often accomplished by the vilification and conscious 
separation of one group from another. Wiktorowicz argues that “asserting a unique 
                                                 
33 Benford and Snow, “Framing Process,” 611. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 614. 
36 Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad,” 171. 
37 Ibid., 162. 
38 Ibid. 
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identify can help secure necessary resources, even if those come from small groups of 
supporters.”39 Negatively framing a rival group can also lead people to object to them 
without even being aware of their platform or core ideals.40 Subsequent chapters in this 
thesis utilize these principles of framing theory to present and analyze public statements 
from prominent jihadi organizations. 
3. Message Framing before the Arab Spring 
Although al-Qaeda has always been a clandestine organization, it has nevertheless 
been very forthcoming with public statements that explain the motivations and 
justifications for its actions. Prior to the Arab Spring, the message framing from the 
group’s media branch was largely consistent with its ideological principles and rarely 
deviated from its global jihadi narrative.41 Christopher Blanchard writes, “The Al-Qaeda 
terrorist network conducted a sophisticated public relations and media campaign…to 
elicit psychological reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global 
audience as well as to specific populations in the Islamic world, the United States, 
Europe, and Asia.”42 With Western and powers denying al-Qaeda financial resources, 
political opportunity, and safe haven, its message framing in the ideological war became 
increasingly important. 
Wiktorowicz argues that al-Qaeda framed its messages to simultaneously 
discredit and vilify its opponents while at the same time exalting and credentialing its 
own organization and belief set.43 Al-Qaeda leaders often found it difficult to discredit 
prominent religious scholars who represented the antithesis to its violent strategies. Many 
of the scholars that attacked jihadi groups’ methods had doctoral degrees in Islamic 
studies, taught at the most prestigious religious universities, and held positions as 
advisors to political leaders. Finding it difficult to question their educational credentials, 
jihadi leaders instead pointed out that these scholars were too heavily influenced by 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 165. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Blanchard, “Al Qaeda,” 1. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad,” 162. 
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corrupt leaders to have their proclamations remain valid. They argued that, while their 
religious knowledge was unassailable, they had little practical conception of politics or 
current realities.44 Vilifying and calling these scholars’ credibility into question was a 
powerful framing tool for al-Qaeda and it resonated deeply with the groups followers. 
This thesis expands upon the framing strategies al-Qaeda employed from its inception in 
1988 to the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010. The presentation of its public 
statements demonstrates the ways in which al-Qaeda framed its messages to maintain 
relevance and support during the tumultuous years during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. 
4. Message Framing during the Arab Spring 
By the time the events of the Arab Spring transpired, the central structure of al-
Qaeda had “been pummeled, and its capabilities to mount large-scale attacks reduced.”45 
In his book Revolution and Revolutionary Movements, James Defronzo writes, “Al-
Qaeda, rather than being a tightly organized hierarchal organization, might more 
accurately be viewed as a transnational social movement attempting to spread and 
popularize its ideas to millions of Muslims who were expected to organize and act with 
little or no direct al-Qaeda assistance.”46 It was in this weakened state that al-Qaeda 
leadership attempted to come to terms with the unexpected revolutions of the Arab 
Spring. 
In their article “Jihadi Discourse in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” Nelly Lahoud 
and Muhammad al’Ubaydi compiled an extensive collection of public statements from al-
Qaeda leadership throughout the duration of the uprisings.47 The initial reactions from al-
Qaeda suggested that it was pleased with the events unfolding throughout the region and 
it released several statements congratulating the protestors on their courageous struggle to 
overthrow corrupt domestic leaders.48 As the citizens of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya began 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 169–70. 
45 Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, viii. 
46 Defronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 339. 
47 Lahoud and al-‘Ubaydi, “Jihad Discourse,” 8. 
48 Ibid., 16. 
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to clamor for democratic elections the message framing from al-Qaeda began to become 
more cautionary.49 
Al-Qaeda had not been a part of the successful removal of long standing dictators 
and the validity of its whole ideology had now come into question. The popular will of 
the masses and not violent strikes against distant enemies had accomplished the task that 
al-Qaeda said could only be fulfilled by its committed jihadi vanguard.50 The al-Qaeda 
organization had been gutted through the relentless pursuit of its leadership, resources, 
and opportunity structures; now its entire ideological framework had become 
questionable. Many news agencies and prominent political figures, including U.S. 
president Barack Obama, publicly stated that this would be the end of al-Qaeda and 
global jihadi ideology in general.51 This was not to be however. The violence and 
political turmoil in MENA did not subside, and the countries that underwent democratic 
transition were faced with seemingly insurmountable economic and social problems. The 
instability in the region opened up new opportunities and battlegrounds for jihadi groups, 
and al-Qaeda emerged as one of the prominent voices in the post Arab Spring 
environment. This thesis further explores the public statements issued by al-Qaeda 
leadership, its regional affiliates, as well as the new jihadi groups that emerged after the 
revolutions. 
5. Global Jihadi Ideological Framing Today 
Many new Jihadi groups have emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. A number of these groups have identified themselves as 
transnational jihadist organizations such as Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, Ansar al-Jihad in 
Egypt, and Jabhat al-Nursa and Islamic State (IS) in Syria.52 While many public 
statements attributed to these groups have espoused their belief in striking the far enemy, 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 17. 
51 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,” The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa. 
52 Lahoud and al-‘Ubaydi, “Jihadi Discourse.” 105 
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their actions to date, however, have focused primarily on sectarian violence and attacks 
against domestic and regional regimes. Many of these groups, including al-Qaeda, have 
urged their audiences to travel to Syria and engage in jihad against the Assad regime.53 
When and if the regional situation begins to normalize these groups may refocus their 
jihadi efforts against the far enemy. This thesis further analyzes current message framing 
trends from al-Qaeda in order to determine what type of targets these organizations are 
emphasizing. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
One hypothesis of this thesis is that the events of the Arab Spring and its 
aftermath had minimal bearing on the ideological framing processes of al-Qaeda and 
other transnational jihadi groups. Al-Qaeda’s public statements during the revolutions 
suggested that it was struggling to retain relevance with its audience and their desire for 
democratic transition. Despite being at odds with the majority of Muslims al-Qaeda 
largely maintained its position that global jihad is the only way to successfully free 
people of repressive regimes and establish an Islamic State. This thesis further analyzes 
the public statements of al-Qaeda’s leadership to determine whether or not its framing 
practices changed considerably in response to the Arab Spring. 
The second hypothesis of this thesis is that the current violence and instability 
resulting from the Arab Spring has shifted global jihadi focus to regional and domestic 
targets. The weak state governance and ongoing civil war in Syria has also created 
opportunities for new global jihadi groups to emerge. Because of the relative ease of 
moving foreign fighters into the Syrian conflict, al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other self-
titled global jihadi groups are now placing greater emphasis on local operations. This 
thesis compiles and analyzes statements from global jihadi groups to determine if they 
are now prioritizing regional goals over operations against the far enemy. 
The third hypothesis of this thesis is that al-Qaeda’s position has been weakened 
by rival jihadi groups who have different objectives and strategies from AQ. Global 
jihadi organizations are not only engaged in an ideological framing contest, but are also 
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vying for recruits and resources. With the steady rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), al-Qaeda has arguably lost its place as the preeminent jihadi organization in the 
world and could potentially be overshadowed by the highly ambitious Islamic State. This 
thesis analyzes public statements from al-Qaeda Central (AQC) to better understand how 
it is framing its ideological contest and determine if there is a possibility for it to coexist 
with other groups despite their numerous differences. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a collection and analysis of public statements from prominent al-
Qaeda spokesmen from before, during, and after the events of the Arab Spring. I 
primarily focus on statements attributed to Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Abu 
Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Because this thesis is focused on the Arab 
Spring’s effect on global jihadi message framing, the statement analysis is mainly 
concentrated on the countries that were directly affected by these popular social 
movements. I discuss framing theory and the strategies that AQC uses to justify its 
ideological positions, garner support, recruit members, and challenge its competitors. 
Analyzing public statements from AQC in the context of the Arab Spring and its 
aftermath highlights subtle shifts in its framing processes during this tumultuous period. 
The Arab Spring has arguably been the most serious threat to the survival of global jihadi 
ideology, and this study attempts to explain how it survived and in many ways flourished 
in the wake of these revolutions. 
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II. PRE-ARAB SPRING AL-QAEDA MESSAGE FRAMING 
From al-Qaeda’s inception in 1988 to the dawn of the Arab Spring in December 
2010, the worlds’ most notorious global jihadi group went through great structural 
change.54 In a relatively short period of time the group rose from its humble beginnings 
in the mountains of Afghanistan to the sophisticated global network that executed dozens 
of deadly attacks across the world. After al-Qaeda’s most infamous attack on 9/11, the 
western world focused abundant resources and manpower to disrupt the group’s safe 
havens, financial networks, and political support structures.55 This Global War on Terror 
was successful in forcing al-Qaeda’s core leadership into deep hiding, effectively 
nullifying the hierarchal command structure that had planned, financed, and executed 
major attacks in the beginning of the 21st century. Al-Qaeda’s central command may 
have undergone significant structural change in the years following 9/11, but its 
ideological message framing practices and dissemination methods have remained largely 
consistent.56 
This chapter analyzes the video messages, books, and proclamations that AQC’s 
leading spokesmen and ideologues released publicly from 1988 to the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring in 2011 in order to demonstrate the consistent message framing practices 
that the group employed. The essay discusses the framing practices of Abdullah Azzam, 
the first theoretician of global jihad, Osama bin Laden, AQC’s charismatic spokesman, 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri, AQC’s leading ideologue and strategist.57 With only minor 
variations between these three global jihadists, the general themes discussed in their 
public messaging campaigns revolved around the primacy of transcontinental jihad, 
Muslim unity, grievances against the west and domestic regimes, as well as importance 
of military action and martyrdom operations.58 This chapter also gives a brief 
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background on Azzam, bin Laden, and Zawahiri as well as highlight examples of their 
messaging practices from 1988 to the end of 2010 to show the consistent nature of their 
message. Later chapters in my thesis discuss how AQC’s message framing practices 
changed in light of the events of the Arab Spring as the group struggled to retain 
relevance. 
The Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb is often credited as the father of global jihadi 
ideology, but it was Palestinian born Abdullah Azzam who truly developed the modern 
concept of global jihad, wrote extensively on the subject, and put it into action on the 
battle fields of Afghanistan.59 Before Azzam traveled to Afghanistan to organize the 
mujahedeen in their struggle against the Soviets, he had spent his life in academic 
universities studying Islamic law. He received his doctorate from the highly regarded Al-
Azhar University in Cairo and spent many years teaching in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Pakistan.60 In addition to his academic background Azzam had some militant 
experience fighting against Israel between 1967–1969.61 While teaching in Peshawar in 
the early 1980’s Azzam moved across the border to join the Afghan and Arab 
mujahedeen that were engaged in a bloody struggle against the Red Army of the USSR.62 
As the fighting in Afghanistan intensified, Azzam became disillusioned with the 
few number of Arab jihadists who had joined the battle and he wrote his two seminal 
works, The Defense of Muslim Territories and Join the Caravan in the mid 1980’s in 
order to encourage more Muslims throughout MENA to join the struggle or send 
financial and humanitarian aid.63 In his work The Defense of Muslim Territories, Azzam 
used his credentials as a religious scholar to argue that jihad was an individual obligation 
(fard ‘ayn) that all Muslims worldwide must commit to.64 He wrote, “Defensive 
jihad…consist of expelling unbelievers from our territory. This is an individual duty, 
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indeed the most important of all individual duties.”65 Azzam argued that defensive jihad 
was necessary especially in cases when unbelievers enter Muslim lands and attempt to 
imprison Muslim people.66 In Defense of Muslim Territories he acknowledged the 
ongoing struggle in Palestine but urged Arab fighters to make the fight in Afghanistan a 
priority due to the tenuous nature of the war, the relative ease of entering Afghanistan, 
and the fact that the mujahedeen were leading the efforts.67 Azzam felt that Afghanistan 
was the most practical fight at that time and his books encouraged his readers to look 
outside the immediate region of the Arabian Peninsula and Levant and join their Muslim 
brothers in their fight against the communists. 
In his work Join the Caravan, Azzam would further elaborate on his definition of 
jihad using religious arguments and historical examples. He argues that “Whoever dies 
without having fought (in a jihad), or having prepared his soul for this battle, dies on a 
branch of hypocrisy…a Muslim who is not performing jihad today is just like one who 
breaks the fast in Ramadan…or a rich person who withholds legal alms.”68 Azzam 
frequently quoted Quaranic texts and used the threat of eternal hellfire to encourage his 
readers to fulfill their God given duty. He writes, “Unless you march forth, He (God) will 
punish you with a severe punishment, and will replace you with another people, and you 
will not harm Him at all.”69 Azzam also appealed directly to young people stating: “since 
jihad is an individual duty, no permission is required from one’s parents, just as such 
permission is unnecessary for those performing the dawn prayer or fasting during the 
month of Ramadan.”70 Like al-Qaeda ideologues that would follow him, Azzam argued 
that jihad is a lifelong duty and every Muslim must risk his life to fulfill the individual 
obligation of pushing unbelievers out of Muslim territories, wherever they may be.71 
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Azzam’s body of work and his ideological message framing would have a tremendous 
impact on both Osama bin Laden and to a lesser extent Ayman al-Zawahiri.72 
Another theme that Azzam spoke of frequently in his written works and public 
statements was martyrdom. His ideological arguments for this type of sacrifice would 
have a resounding impact on the tactics al-Qaeda would later use in its attacks on western 
targets. Azzam argued that martyrdom was one of the greatest things a Muslim could 
achieve.73 He quoted Quranic verses and hadith that promised great rewards for 
martyrdom such as the forgiveness of sin, a place in Paradise, seventy-two wives, and 
“intercession for seventy people of his household.”74 Azzam stated that a martyr is a 
courageous Muslim who dies in a righteous battle against unbelievers.75 Azzam is 
credited with developing the modern cult of martyrdom in radical Sunni Islamist 
ideology; to many jihadists, this remains “the ultimate form of devotion to God.”76 
Another theme that Azzam frequently wrote about was the importance of a jihadi 
vanguard. In his work Solid Base, he argues that “every principle must be supported by a 
vanguard, which clears a path for itself toward society, at the price of vast efforts and 
heavy sacrifices…every dogma, even if its comes from the Lord of the worlds, will be 
stillborn if it does not find a vanguard that sacrifices itself and expends every effort in 
order to defend it.”77 The concept of an elite vanguard leading the way for the greater 
Muslim world would become an important ideological framing practice for AQC in the 
years after the Afghan war and continues to be a major theme in its public statements 
today.78 Azzam’s literary legacy is still felt in modern radical Islamist circles, and his 
tutelage and partnership with a young Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan where the two 
men established the Service Bureau (Maktab al-Khadamat) set the foundation and 
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ideological framework for al-Qaeda.79 Azzam religious credentials gave him more 
credibility than subsequent al-Qaeda ideologues and it is possible that al-Qaeda could 
have been a much more formidable organization had he not been killed by a car bomb in 
1988.80 
If Abdullah Azzam can be credited with laying the framework for modern global 
jihadist ideology, Osama bin Laden can be regarded as the individual who brought this 
esoteric ideological message to the masses and more devastatingly, acted upon it on a 
global scale.81 Bin Laden, a Saudi national, did not have the religious credentials that 
made Azzam a respected ideologue in the radical Islamist world. He was the son a 
wealthy real estate developer and spent his formative years in living in Jeddah. In high 
school and later studying at King Abdul Aziz University he became interested in Islamic 
activism.82 In his first forays into militancy he helped finance the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood in its efforts to overthrow the secular regime of Hafez al-Assad in Syria.83 
Bin Laden took a more direct role in the early 1980s when he traveled to Afghanistan to 
work as a financier and logistician for the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Army.84 It was 
during this period that bin Laden met Azzam and they formed the Service Bureau 
(Maktab al-Khadamat), an organization that recruited and trained Arab jihadists in 
Afghanistan.85 Bin Laden worked primarily as a financial broker between the 
mujahedeen and wealthy donors on the Arabian Peninsula while Azzam was the 
ideologue and group patriarch.86 
In Afghanistan bin Laden also came into contact with Egyptian Ayman al-
Zawahiri and together they drifted away from Azzam. By the late 1980s bin Laden and 
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al-Zawahiri had been forced into exile in Afghanistan after attempting to establish 
jihadist strongholds in Sudan and Yemen.87 By this point bin Laden had identified the 
United States and to a lesser extent Israel as the prime enemies subjugating the Muslim 
people. Bin Laden argued that, since the 1983 intervention in the Lebanese civil war, the 
United States had been interfering in the Muslim world.88 After the first Gulf War in Iraq 
bin Laden had hardened his opinion that the United States represented a crusader force in 
the heart of the Muslim holy land and efforts were needed to force them out.89 From his 
base in Afghanistan bin Laden began planning strikes against this new far enemy and 
putting together his media campaign in order to gain additional financial support and 
recruits. 
It is important to understand how the media space in the Arab world was going 
through rapid changes in the early to mid-1990s. This would have a profound effect on 
the ability for al-Qaeda to promulgate its messages and control its framing strategy. 
Before the 1990s the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula had been able to restrict the flow 
of information to a relatively high degree through state controlled newspapers, radio, and 
television, but in the 1990s several prominent Arabic language newspapers began to 
migrate from Beirut to London in order to escape harsh censorship or in some cases 
persecution for printing articles critical of ruling regimes.90 The first gulf war was also a 
worldwide media event and many Muslims across MENA were looking for real-time and 
accurate television news.91 By 1996, the Al-Jazeera News network had been established 
in Qatar and millions of Muslims were now able to consume relatively unbiased reporting 
and also had the opportunity to see interviews with controversial figures that were often 
critical of regional powers.92 With the advancement of the Internet and its increasing 
prevalence in the 1990s, the Muslim world now had many outlets to receive information, 
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and for groups like al-Qaeda, along with other groups spanning the ideological spectrum, 
they now had the ability to promulgate their ideology on a massive stage. 
For visual media, bin Laden realized that almost as important as the message itself 
was the aesthetics, language, and duration of the media product.93 His typical videos 
were succinct, with simple backgrounds, narrated in unsophisticated language.94 In this 
fashion he could ensure that the quick-cycling news media aired his short videos and that 
the simple messages reached a large audience with varying levels of education and 
religious training.95 In al-Qaeda’s early days it also attacked targets that “emphasize[d] 
the image” rather than dealing crippling blows the military units or vital economic 
infrastructure.96 A gun attack at a Jewish synagogue would symbolize Palestine’s fight 
against Israel, while a bombing at an American embassy would represent al-Qaeda 
attacking U.S. foreign policy.97 The visuals of the attacks themselves were powerful 
messages and part of al-Qaeda’s coordinated framing strategy. Al-Qaeda’s overall 
military strategy would evolve over time to focus more heavily on economic and military 
victories against the U.S. armed forces in Iraq but in its infancy, al-Qaeda deliberately 
chose targets that would elicit emotion through powerful visuals.98 
In al-Qaeda’s message framing, bin Laden, with the heavy influence of Ayman al-
Zawahiri took the foundations of global jihad that Abdullah Azzam had laid out and built 
upon them exponentially. Bin Laden especially expanded upon the idea of the importance 
of attacking the far enemy before focusing on corrupt domestic regimes. In a 1997 CNN 
interview, when asked about his main criticism of the Saudi government, bin Laden said, 
“Regarding the criticism of the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula, 
the first one is their subordination to the United States. So our main problem is the U.S. 
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government, while the Saudi regime is but a branch or an agent of the U.S.”99 Bin Laden 
went on to state that the American government were immune to words, only understand 
violence, and “our people in the Arabian Peninsula will send [the United States a] 
message with no words, because [they] do not understand them.”100 
In many of his public statements bin Laden would address the American public 
directly to explain the reasons for al-Qaeda’s attacks against them and give prescriptive 
advice on how they can ensure their future security. In one such message to the America 
public bin Laden stated: “sensible people would never squander their security, wealth, 
and children for the sake of the liar in the White House…Your security is not in the 
hands of Kerry, or Bush, or al-Qaeda…it is in your hands, and any state that does not 
violate our security has automatically guaranteed its own.”101 Pursuing the United States 
would be the hallmark of bin Laden’s framing practices for the duration of his tenure as 
al-Qaeda’s lead spokesman. His successor Ayman al-Zawahiri would have a more 
complex messaging strategy that would focus on a broader number of topics and enemies. 
Like his mentor Azzam, bin Laden spoke frequently about the need for an Islamic 
vanguard, and he positioned al-Qaeda as the group that would selflessly fight for the 
Muslim world. He stated: “We carry out the mission, and the rest of the ummah is thereby 
absolved.”102 Bin Laden described al-Qaeda as a pious group of dedicated Islamic 
warriors who had disavowed worldly possessions and family to take up the noble cause 
of Jihad.103 Quintan Wiktorowicz argues that this form of self-exaltation and 
credentialing is a powerful framing practice used in many social movements.104 Bin 
Laden intended to show the contrast between his noble vanguard and the morally corrupt 
governments of the United States and other domestic regimes. AQC under the leadership 
of bin Laden would continue to tout itself as the one true vanguard fighting for the 
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freedom of the Muslim world, until the events of the Arab Spring called this assertion 
into greater question. 
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, bin Laden began to release more public 
messages that compared historical events from the time of the rightly guided caliphs with 
current events. He would recount stories of Persian invasions of Muslim lands and 
compare this to the U.S.-led coalition waging war in the Arabian Peninsula.105 It is 
difficult to gauge how much this messaging campaign influenced events, but from 2003–
2006 thousands of foreign fighters and Iraqis joined al-Qaeda’s affiliate organization in 
Iraq to fight against the invading forces and western backed government.106 Bin Laden 
urged his audience to find courage in the examples of brave Muslims of the past who 
against insurmountable odds fought off superior forces. He would cite successful attacks 
against the U.S. embassies in East Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole, and 9/11 as 
examples of military victories that demonstrate the wests vulnerability and encouraged 
would be jihadists to follow these examples and join al-Qaeda in its struggle in Iraq.107 
Throughout bin Laden’s life he would continue to publicly emphasize how the crusader 
armies of the west’s presence in the Middle Ease was proof of history repeating itself and 
therefore it was incumbent upon all Muslims to heed God’s word and fulfill their duty of 
defensive jihad. 
Bin Laden also frequently warned of the dangers of governmental systems that 
were not based on God’s law as well as the evils of nationalism.108 Bin Laden firmly 
believed that democratic intuitions were an affront to God and that any Muslims who 
willingly participated in elections or sought office are unbelievers.109 As Iraq was going 
through its first wave of free elections after the fall of Saddam Hussein, bin Laden 
released the following statement: “Parliaments are ignorant religion, so those who obey 
princes and ulema (who allow what God has forbidden, like entering legislative councils, 
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and forbid what God has allowed, like jihad) commit the sin of making these men lords in 
place of God.”110 Bin Laden also warned against nationalist tendencies that separated 
Muslim countries into fragmented and warring entities. He argued that since the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, powerful western states have sought to divide the Muslim people in 
order to better control the population, grow rich from the lands natural resources, and 
ensure the survival of the Israeli state.111 For bin Laden and al-Qaeda the Muslim world 
would never be free from oppression until western imposed borders were erased, all 
unbelievers are pushed from Muslim lands, and the caliph is reinstated.112 
Before Ayman al-Zawahiri became AQC’s leader after the death of Osama bin 
Laden he was the groups principle ideologue and strategist. Today he is perhaps the most 
well know global jihadist but he came to that particular brand of Islamic radicalism 
relatively late in his life.113 The Egyptian born al-Zawahiri was a diligent adherent of 
compatriot Sayyid Qutb, and from an early age he was heavily involved in political 
activism. He was imprisoned and allegedly tortured for his role in the assassination of 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981.114 After being released al-Zawahiri traveled to 
Afghanistan where he led the group the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. It was there that he 
united with Osama bin Laden.115 Despite his participation in the war in Afghanistan al-
Zawahiri’s focus remained overthrowing the secular regime in Cairo.116 His early 
writings and proclamations dealt primarily with this singular domestic issue and it was 
not until 1998 when al-Zawahiri merged his group with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 
organization that he shifted his views towards a global jihadi ideology.117 His merge with 
al-Qaeda may have been just as pragmatically motivated, as it was ideological because al-
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Zawahiri had been finding it difficult to secure funding for his organization.118 Since that 
time he has written and spoken prolifically on the importance of global jihad and even 
today remains AQC’s lead spokesman. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri was not the charismatic icon that bin Laden was, but he has 
written several major works, such as Knights under the Prophets Banner, that are highly 
regarded and referenced frequently in radical Islamist circles.119 His published works 
echo the earlier writings of Abdullah Azzam but expand considerably on the importance 
of striking the far enemy.120 Al-Zawahiri furthered the idea that conflict with domestic 
regimes in the Muslim world was not possible while the United States still supported 
them militarily and financially and therefore strikes against the far enemy should take 
precedence.121 Al-Zawahiri was careful to frame al-Qaeda’s attacks against U.S. targets 
as specific acts of retaliation for perceived assaults against Islam.122 For example, the 
U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa were in response to CIA arrests of prominent 
jihadi leaders while the suicide attack on the USS Cole was retaliation for U.S. airstrikes 
on jihadi training camps in Afghanistan.123 
In his book Knights Under the Prophets Banner, al-Zawahiri spoke earnestly 
about the importance of brining the battle to the enemy rather than letting the United 
States and its allies dictate the terms of conflict.124 Al-Zawahiri argued that striking the 
enemy at home would either make them abandon their interests in the Muslim world or 
draw them into direct conflict.125 From his writings al-Zawahiri appears to prefer the 
outcome where the United States invades Muslim countries. He argues that any invasion 
by unbelievers “will turn the struggle into a clear cut jihad.”126 His writings indicate that 
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al-Zawahiri values the unifying power that a foreign invasion could have on the Muslim 
world more than protecting innocent people from the devastation of war. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri writes extensively about the importance of Muslim unity. 
Like bin Laden he consistently encouraged cooperation, or at the very least tolerance, 
between Shia and Sunni sects as well as cooperation between different ethnicities and 
nationalities. He understood the importance in strength in numbers and saw sectarian 
violence as a major inhibitor to achieving al-Qaeda’s ultimate goal of repelling the 
invaders and reestablishing the caliphate.127 In a private letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
the leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, al-Zawahiri urged his subordinate to put an 
end to the widespread sectarian violence. He asked in reference to the al-Zarqawi’s 
attacks against the Shia: “is this inevitable? Can it be deferred until the jihadist 
movement’s strength increases? And even if some operation can be qualified as self-
defense, are they all necessary? Or have there been unjustified operation? Is it wise to 
open up a new front, in addition to those with the Americans and the government.”128 For 
al-Zawahiri the belief that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) should not attack Shia communities 
was not only pragmatic but ideological as well. He asked al-Zarqawi: “And will [AQI] 
kill ordinary Shiites, when their ignorance ensures that they will be forgiven? What will 
we loose if we do not attack the Shiities?”129 Despite his great misgivings al-Zawahiri 
continued to support the efforts of al-Zarqawi because his organization continued to find 
tremendous success against the United States from 2003–2006.130 However, throughout 
his tenure as al-Qaeda’s most prominent ideologue and leader, his public messaging has 
remained consistent in regards to the importance of Muslim unity. 
Al-Zawahiri also writes frequently about the dangers of democracy. Like bin 
Laden he compares it to a religion where men control men, create their own laws, and 
contradicts God’s divine guidance.131 Al-Zawahiri frequently pointed to examples in 
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history where Islamic groups attempted to incorporate themselves into democratic 
systems and failed. He argued that “The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 
Algeria…wanted to use the ballot boxes in a bid to reach the presidential palace and 
ministries, but at the gates tanks were waiting, loaded with French ammunition pointing 
at those who had forgotten the rules of the battle between justice and falsehood.”132 He 
publicly vilified prominent religious leaders like Saudi cleric Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz 
who urged Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan to vote in democratic elections.133 He 
publicly framed these religious leaders as misguided, hypocritical, and pawns of corrupt 
domestic regimes.134 
It can be argued that al-Zawahiri’s prodigious and diverse output of messages, 
videos, interviews, and written works have been counter-productive to his framing 
strategy. He publicly criticized everything from France’s ban on Islamic headscarves to 
non-Muslim NGOs conducting humanitarian disaster relief after an earthquake in 
Pakistan.135 Bin Laden did not overwhelm his audience with information in the way that 
al-Zawahiri has typically done, and therefore received wider coverage when rare 
messages were released.136 At the turn of the millennium al-Zawahiri’s speeches received 
front-page coverage but the increasing volume of his messages, and the often-mundane 
subject matter made his talking points less relevant and news worthy.137 This chapter has 
demonstrated that al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, and Abdullah Azzam maintained a 
consistent message framing campaign since al-Qaeda’s inception in 1988 to the dawn of 
the Arab Spring in 2011. Although there have been slight variations in individual styles 
of public messaging, the themes and language have been constant. Subsequent chapters 
will discuss AQC’s sudden shift in framing practices due to the unforeseen events of the 
Arab Spring. 
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III. A STRUGGLE FOR RELEVANCE: AL-QAEDA’S 
IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING DURING THE ARAB SPRING 
In May 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama addressed the world regarding the 
tremendous events of the Arab Spring and how these popular revolutions would be the 
end of al-Qaeda’s ideology: “By the time we found bin Laden, al Qaeda’s agenda had 
come to be seen by the vast majority of the region as a dead end, and the people of the 
Middle East and North Africa had taken their future into their own hands.”138 The world 
watched with reserved optimism that the popular revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya 
would usher in a new era of stability and peace in a region fraught with decades of 
violence and oppression. When the majority of Muslims in these countries demanded 
democratic elections, many foreign policy analysts, academics, and world leaders 
believed that these states could provide the models for further democratization in the 
region. Moreover, many people echoed the sentiments of President Obama and believed 
these revolutions could provide a viable alternative to the radical methods of al-Qaeda 
and effectively end global jihadi ideology. 
The events of the Arab Spring did present al-Qaeda with unprecedented 
challenges. The much-maligned dictators in several Muslim countries had been toppled 
by popular social movements and not the global jihadi vanguard. Western powers, or the 
far enemy, did not intervene to prevent this from happening and in the case of Libya, 
even aided the people’s revolution against Gadhafi. Finally, the popular call for 
democratic elections further distanced the majority of Muslims from al-Qaeda’s radical 
designs for an Islamic form of governance. 
To al-Qaeda’s leadership, the toppling of these Muslim regimes provided them an 
unexpected opportunity to mobilize the population and transform society into their ideal 
model, but their vision appeared to be at odds with the majority’s will as viewed by the 
Arab Spring. Global jihadi ideology had only ever resonated with a small minority of 
Muslims and al-Qaeda faced a stern challenge in trying to redirect the momentum of 
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these social movements away from democratic transition.139 This chapter analyzes the 
public statements from prominent al-Qaeda leaders during the events of the Arab Spring 
to demonstrate how they framed their ideological narrative and attempted and ultimately 
failed to sway their broad audience towards their vision. I limit the focus of my analysis 
to the Shuyukh al-Jihad (Sheikhs of Jihad) who are the prominent voices that shape the 
core leadership of the AL Qaeda organization and speak to a global audience.140 This 
group included Osama bin Laden, Ayam al-Zawahiri, Atiyya al-Libi, and Abu Yahya al-
Libi. I argue that, while their discourse during the Arab Spring failed to convince the 
majority of Muslims to abandon democratic transition, they did, however, successfully 
capitalize on other less ambitious opportunities to exploit and further their ideological 
agenda.141 
By the time the Arab Spring swept across MENA in the winter of 2011, al-Qaeda 
was a highly decentralized organization with numerous autonomous affiliates acting 
independently from any core leadership base.142 The decade long Global War on Terror 
waged by the United States and its allies had been effective in limiting opportunity 
structures, resources, and safe havens that al-Qaeda enjoyed for many years.143 Affiliate 
groups were still active in various parts of the region, but operations were not being 
planned or organized by the surviving al-Qaeda leadership. They did still posses one 
critical instrument, however, their ideology, and the ability to disseminate it quickly and 
effectively to a global audience.144 Within jihadi circles, the old guard of al-Qaeda still 
maintained tremendous influence due to the numerous high profile attacks that they had 
carried out against the far enemy. When longstanding dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya fell, these leaders seized the opportunity to appeal to the broader Muslim 
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community and urged them to capitalize on their victories and usher in a new Islamic 
golden age. 
Although bin Laden would not live long enough to witness how the Arab Spring 
would play out in its entirety, he nevertheless observed the initial stages and welcomed it 
with cautious optimism. In his personal letters to associates, which were later released 
publicly, he stated, “the fall of the remaining tyrants in the region was inevitable,” but al-
Qaeda must capitalize on these events by “educating and warning Muslim people [about] 
half solutions.”145 Bin Laden was speaking directly about democratic elections and 
political Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Ennahda Party in 
Tunisia.146 Bin Laden believed al-Qaeda could provide religious council and advise 
Muslim people on the merits and methods of creating an Islamic state now that the 
obstacle of corrupt domestic regimes had been removed.147 With bin Laden’s death, it 
became incumbent on the remaining leadership to bring this message to the people. The 
topic of democratic transition became the most troubling issue for al-Qaeda to reconcile. 
Its public statements were at times cautionary and in some cases highly critical and 
accusatory. 
When just over half of all Tunisians and Egyptians, and nearly 62 percent of 
Libyans turned out for elections following the revolutions, al-Qaeda leaders were faced 
with a difficult situation.148 Abu Yahya al-Libi criticized democracy as a “more spacious 
prison,” while al-Zawahiri attempted to incorporate the democratic process into jihadi 
ideology by linking it to the first four rightly guided Caliphs. Al-Zawahiri argued “that it 
was through the ‘consensus of the umm’ (ijma’ al-umma) that the Rightly-Guided 
Caliphs were appointed.”149 Despite his statements affirming that the Muslim people 
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should be able to choose their own leaders, he still rejected the direct electoral process. In 
jihadi ideology, leaders should be elected by a small group of educated elites.150 There 
are obvious problems with this framework; al-Zawahiri provided no coherent method on 
how this council should be formed or who in particular should be considered for 
membership.151 Jihadi ideology is severely lacking in the nuanced practicalities required 
for implementing an Islamic State in the modern era. 
As events unfolded during the Arab Spring it became clear to al-Qaeda’s leaders 
that the majority of people desired democratic institutions. Their ideology was adverse to 
“the formation, of political parties, contesting elections and the establishment of 
democratic regimes…they deem[ed] such processes to be guided by positive law (i.e., 
man-made law) and in their minds, holding elections constitute[s] a violation of God’s 
law.152 In a message to the Egyptian people Ayman al-Zawahiri stated, “who should 
judge and rule, the people or the Creator of the people? If we concede to the enemies of 
Islam that rule is by the people, then we are defeated before we start the battle.”153 Al-
Zawahiri went on to argue that that Egyptians must not let the far enemy manipulate 
these revolutions and turn the country away from an Islamic path. 
Al-Zawahiri concluded his address by stating, “the Islamic movement must rise 
above its organizational and partisan disagreements in order to fulfill the main demands 
of the ummah, the most important of which is the application of Sharia, liberation from 
external control, and removal of injustice from the poor classes.”154 Al-Zawahiri has 
been consistent in his view that democracy, as conceived by westrn powers, is 
blasphemous and an obstacle preventing Muslims from building a society in God’s 
model.155 The high voter turnout in the post-revolutionary countries indicates that al-
                                                 
150 Ibid., 20. 
151 Lahoud and al-‘Ubaydi, “Jihadi Discourse,” 20. 
152 Ibid., 17. 
153 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Why Did We Revolt Against Him?” Global Terrorism Research Project, 
February 29, 2012, http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/8489/ZAW20120229. 
pdf?sequence=4. 
154 Ibid., 6. 
155 Kepel and Milelli, Al Qaeda in its Own Words, 184 
 33 
Zawahiri’s pleas were not well received by the majority of Muslims. He may, however, 
have felt vindicated with the spectacular failures of the political Islamist parties in Egypt 
and Tunisia, but his ideology was still radically out of step with mainstream society. 
Democratic transition was not the only issue troubling al-Qaeda’s leadership. 
Much of the organizations creditability was based on action and results. Al-Qaeda had 
always prided itself on backing up its rhetoric and ideology with devastating attacks 
against its stated enemies. In its pursuit of mobilizing future jihadists and garnering 
broader public support al-Qaeda needed to demonstrate that it was a legitimate force 
capable of achieving its strategic objectives of striking the far enemy until it loses resolve 
in supporting the near enemy.156 Examples of successful results from its attacks are not 
quite as apparent. Al-Qaeda’s multi decade terror campaign against the west has not 
weakened its enemy’s resolve and it cannot claim that transnational jihad has ever 
effectively deposed a corrupt domestic regime either. More worrying for al-Qaeda was 
the fact that popular social revolutions had effectively accomplished this task in mere 
months. 
Al-Qaeda leaders needed to be shown as active participants in these revolutions or 
they risked loosing relevance. Bin Laden was the first al-Qaeda leader to take some credit 
for the Arab Spring revolutions when he argued that the jihad against the west had 
“weakened the United States ‘to such a degree that it enabled the Muslim people to 
reclaim confidence and courage’ and therefore rebel against the ‘agents of America.’”157 
Atiyya al-Libi echoed bin Laden’s sentiments when he stated that al-Qaeda had sparked 
the revolutions by “spreading the sprit of challenge and sustaining power of rejecting and 
disdaining injustice.”158 Ayman al-Zawahiri not only claimed that al-Qaeda’s operations 
had inspired the revolutions but he also argued that his organization had drained the 
United States economically and it was now unable and unwilling to continue to support 
its former allies in the region.159 These public attempts claiming credit for the revolutions 
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were wishful at best. Al-Qaeda’s long held claim that transnational jihad is the ‘only 
solution’ to depose corrupt domestic regimes was verifiably disproven with the Arab 
Spring revolutions.160 It could be argued, however, that al-Qaeda’s ideological argument 
was bolstered by subsequent failures of peaceful democratic transition in Egypt and 
Libya. The ongoing democratic transition in Tunisia has promise but to date there is not 
an example of a completely successful social revolution stemming from the Arab Spring. 
Al-Qaeda found very little success in its attempts to claim credit for the Arab 
Spring and even less success in convincing Muslims to abandon democratic transition. 
Despite this, the Arab Spring did present al-Qaeda with new opportunities to exploit. The 
Syrian Civil war became a very pertinent example of how apostate regimes and their 
western allies were a scourge on the Muslim world. It is estimated that nearly 200,000 
people have died since hostilities began in Syria and hundreds of thousands more have 
been displaced.161 Al-Qaeda capitalized on the bloodshed and chaos gripping the country 
and it released numerous messages calling for Muslims to join the jihad against the Assad 
regime. Al-Qaeda also forged an alliance with Jabhat al-Nusra, which is now arguably its 
most active and visible affiliate organization.162 The heavy influx of foreign fighters and 
the ongoing violence have become fodder for al-Qaeda’s propaganda campaign. Abu 
Yahya al-Libi issued the following statement to his global audience: 
Your demand is clear and specific, which is overthrowing the oppressive 
regime and offering the country and the people comfort away from it. And 
for you have bore the burden of what the near and the far [people] 
witnessed. And today, we see the schemes of the West –headed by 
America—sewing [sic] their threads against your revolution so they can 
answer the furthest of the people’s demand by offering security to 
civilians under supervision of their [West] envoys and under the mandate 
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of the criminal regime, which means solidifying its pillars and letting the 
way in front of it to catch its breathe again.163 
Al-Qaeda began focusing much of its attention on not only encouraging Syrians to 
take up arms against Assad, but foreign fighters as well. The relative ease in which 
participants can cross the border in Turkey and Jordan has made Syria an accessible 
jihadi destination. It is estimated that there are now nearly 12,000 foreign fighters in 
Syria, albeit only a fraction of them aligned to an al-Qaeda affiliate.164 Ayman Al 
Zawahiri has publicly called on the lions of Jordan, Turkey, and Syria to take up arms 
against the Assad regime and, “be one of the supportive rank in deterring their attack and 
in pushing back their domination, and seek to establish the Sharia of your Lord, and go 
onward dependent on Allah.”165 The Arab Spring may have damaged al-Qaeda’s 
ideological narrative in many parts of MENA, but it has a pertinent new cause to 
champion with the Syrian civil war. 
Al-Qaeda has never had broad appeal but its message does resonate with many 
Muslims, especially when they are living under despotic regimes that are supported by 
western powers. With the fall of the dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, however, the 
majority of Muslims seized the opportunity to shape new countries that were inclusive of 
their own varied beliefs and ideals. The instrument that the majority of people chose for 
this reshaping of society was democracy and the direct electoral process. Across the 
Muslim world, large numbers of secularists, political Islamists, and Salafists turned out in 
droves to elect leaders that would represent their interests. Al-Qaeda’s leadership had 
failed to capitalize on the unprecedented opportunities that the Arab Spring brought. 
Their broad appeals to Muslims in these newly freed countries largely fell on deaf ears. 
This should not be surprising because the majority of people in the Muslim world do not 
seek the radical reshaping of society that al-Qaeda touts. Even conservative strands of 
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Islamism accept that the democratic political process is the best way to incrementally 
bring society closer to the Koranic model. 
This is not to say that global jihadi ideology is no longer salient to many people. 
Al-Qaeda still has numerous opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa that it can 
exploit. The ongoing civil war in Syria has become the new rallying cry for global jihad 
and the failure of smooth democratic transitions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya gives 
renewed credibility to the al-Qaeda’s narrative that it is a flawed form of man made 
governance. Al-Qaeda can also point to the enduring and highly visible presence of the 
United States and other western powers in the Arab World as evidence that Muslims are 
still being oppressed and killed by crusader forces. Al-Qaeda’s vanguard of global 
jihadists did not topple the corrupt Muslim regimes during the Arab Spring, nor could 
they mobilize the general population to embrace the radical implementation of Islamic 




IV. POST-ARAB SPRING AL-QAEDA MESSAGE FRAMING 
Several scholarly journals and books, including Nelly Lahoud’s “Jihadi Discourse 
in the Wake of the Arab Spring” and Fawaz Gerge’s The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, have 
been written about al-Qaeda Central’s response to the Arab Spring and how its 
inconsistent message framing during that period jeopardized the group’s long-term 
survival. With the possible exception of Tunisia, it became clear that peaceful democratic 
transitions in Egypt, Libya, and Syria would not materialize. This resuscitated the ailing 
global jihadi movement and provided it with new opportunities to advance its agenda.166 
The leaders of AQC have largely returned to their traditional message framing processes 
and are once again embroiled in a contest with rival groups to win adherents, financial 
support, and ideological superiority. This chapter analyzes the public statements of AQC 
in the wake of the Arab Spring to determine current trends in its message framing. This 
chapter will argue that AQC has begun to reemphasize its position that the far enemy is 
the biggest and most pressing threat to the Muslim world and that it is still calling for 
attacks against western targets, albeit on a smaller scale than previous operations. I will 
also argue that AQC has shifted some of its focus to regional jihadi campaigns in order to 
capitalize on the ongoing conflict in Syria, which has resonated deeply with jihadists 
around the world. This chapter will also argue that the new global jihadi groups that have 
emerged in places such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and the Indian sub-continent 
have echoed the sentiments of al-Qaeda in its calls for attacks against the far enemy. The 
global jihadi movement may not have the same prominence it once did but its ideology 
and message framing live on and continues to threaten the security of western states as 
well as local regimes. 
AQC’s message framing during the events of the Arab Spring seemed 
contradictory to the desires of the vast majority of the population in MENA. AQC 
frequently urged its audience to abandon the democratic transition process and instead 
work towards a unified Muslim community governed by sharia law.167 Al-Qaeda’s 
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ability to ensure the long-term survival of its belief system is predicated largely on 
winning the framing contest with rival ideological competitors. Whether the competitors 
are democratic governments, Islamic clerics, rival jihadi networks, or the Muslim 
community in general, al-Qaeda must assert enough authority in the ideological realm to 
continue to maintain a support base or it may face eventual extinction. AQC has always 
been cognizant of carefully managing its ideological narrative and keeping its message 
framing consistent. The events of the Arab Spring forced AQC leadership to rapidly 
respond to the fluid and ever changing circumstances of the revolutions and their 
message framing was often confused, contradictory, and antagonistic toward their target 
audience.168 Al-Qaeda as an organization had been decimated by the GWOT and in the 
wake of the Arab Spring it appeared that its ideological narrative was also in danger of 
falling into obscurity. 
The prediction that al-Qaeda and global jihad would perish with the political 
revolutions of the Arab Spring now appear to have been a gross miscalculation by 
academics and analysts alike. The power vacuum that materialized with the fall of several 
autocratic regimes and the ongoing violence in Syria and Iraq have created fertile ground 
for al-Qaeda and other newly formed jihadi groups to operate.169 As turmoil persists in 
MENA, al-Qaeda has returned to its core framing practices of the past. In the struggle for 
authority, these groups must endeavor to establish credibility if they are to have 
successful framing campaigns.170 If leaders are not perceived as honest, intellectual, and 
above reproach the resonance of their message can be lost.171 In the process of group 
framing it is also important to draw stark parallels between different movements. This is 
often accomplished by the vilification and conscious separation of one group from 
another. Negatively framing a rival group can also lead people to object to them without 
even being aware of their platform or core ideals.172 During the Arab Spring, al-Qaeda’s 
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leadership departed from these effective framing strategies and in some cases began 
vilifying the very people they claimed to represent. Their own credibility was also called 
into question because these revolutions had come about through popular social 
movements against the near enemy and not the global jihad. This chapter will 
demonstrate that AQC has returned to these core-framing strategies in the wake of the 
Arab Spring. 
As the current chief of AQC, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s public statements are arguably 
the most important examples of the current trends in global jihadi message framing 
practices. He has returned to the core framing strategies that al-Qaeda has used in the 
past, including the call for attacks against the far enemy. In a public message released in 
September, 2013 al-Zawahiri stated, “We should bleed America economically by 
provoking it to continue in its massive expenditure on its security.”173 Knowing the limits 
of AQC and his affiliate organizations, al-Zawahiri calls for small attacks against the 
United States and its allies that will force them to expend great amounts of resources and 
time on bolstering their security procedures. His pragmatic messages do not call for 
grandiose displays of power like those seen on 9/11, rather he calls for attacks similar to 
the Boston bombings. Al-Zawahiri stated, “The Boston incident confirms to the 
Americans…that they are not facing individuals, organizations or groups, but they are 
facing an uprising Ummah (community), that rose in jihad to defend its soul, dignity and 
capabilities…What the American regime refuses to admit is that al-Qaeda was a message 
before it was an organization.”174 While he still emphasizes the far enemy, the strategy 
he is promoting is akin to a leaderless global jihad where lone individuals carry out small 
attacks on western targets to gradually wear them down economically and defeat their 
resolve to intervene in the affairs of the Muslim world. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s message framing in the wake of the Arab Spring has also 
emphasized the need for broad cooperation of all Muslims. His messages stand in stark 
contrast to the rhetoric and actions of ISIS who have engaged in a broad sectarian 
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campaign against non-Sunnis. Al-Zawahiri has repeatedly urged Muslims of all 
nationalities, denominations, and ethnic backgrounds to set aside their differences and 
come together in a united jihad. From a strategic point of view, unifying the numerous 
jihadi groups throughout MENA could provide a substantial force that would potentially 
be capable of overthrowing governments and seizing large land areas. Al-Zawahiri is also 
cautious of the negative repercussions and press that come from sectarian violence. The 
vicious attacks against the Shiites in Iraq at the hands of al-Qaeda in Iraq galvanized 
broad support against the group and led to its eventual downfall. Al-Zawahiri is also 
conscious of the backlash ISIS has felt due to its sectarian violence and treatment of 
western captives. The actions of ISIS have galvanized broad international cooperation 
that seeks to contain and destroy the group. 
In a recorded video message from April 2014 al-Zawahiri urges Muslims in Syria 
and Iraq to come together in order to overthrow the al-Assad regime. He stated: “Unity is 
(the jihadis’) fortress against the flood of the conspiracies plotted against them. It is not 
reasonable that the Shi’ites unite and the Sunnis fight against one another. So everyone 
should prioritize the interest of Islam and the Ummah over his organizational or partisans 
interest.”175 Al-Zawahiri’s statement is a counter-narrative to that of ISIS and several 
other jihadi groups that are not only fighting the al-Assad regime but each other. AQC is 
adamant that infighting is counterproductive to its cause and only furthers the goals of 
corrupt domestic regimes and the far enemy. The sectarian violence is one of the primary 
reason the AQC has distanced itself from the Islamic State.176 
It is not difficult to find public statements by al-Zawahiri that contradicts his 
message of unity. In the same video where he pleads for broad cooperation between 
Sunnis and Shia he calls for Muslims to take up arms against Hezbollah.177 When asked 
what should be done about the Lebanese-based Islamist armed group al-Zawahiri replied: 
“In my opinion, and Allah knows better, the so-called Hezbollah is an aggressor enemy 
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against the souls and honor of the Muslims, and their sanctities, and it is an ally to a 
regime that is among the most criminal regimes. The aggressor enemy must be deterred 
by any legitimate means.”178 For al-Zawahiri, the actions and politics of certain select 
groups are too abhorrent to put aside differences and create a unified front. Despite 
occasional instances where al-Zawahiri calls for violence against competing jihadi 
groups, AQC’s broader narrative in the wake of the Arab Spring is one of unity and peace 
between all Muslims. 
Another theme that has pervaded in AQC’s entire message framing campaign 
after the Arab Spring is the United State’s complicity in local government repression and 
the killing of innocent Muslims. This narrative should not be surprising since the 
organization was founded on the principle that the far enemy is ultimately responsible for 
the subjugation and murder of the Ummah but it is important to note that AQC still views 
the west as the primary enemy in the global jihad. Al-Zawahiri continually points out the 
hypocritical nature of Washington’s statements about the importance of democracy and 
what they actually desire in the Middle East. He has repeatedly pointed to examples in 
Egypt and Palestine where the United States has either actively thwarted democratically 
elected governments or quietly acquiesced as they are deposed by internal elements.179 
Al-Zawahiri also frequently discusses the United State’s treatment of Muslim 
detainees and how this contradicts the government’s public statements supporting human 
rights. In an interview conducted in April, 2014 al-Zawahiri was asked about the 
mistreatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and Washington’s desire for democracy in 
the Middle East. He stated: 
Agreements about prisoners, preventing torture, and human rights—all 
these agreements—the West wrote them for itself, to be applied on the 
Westerners in their wars among one another. However, they deny them 
and abrogate them when they fight the Muslims, just like democracy, 
which they consider a doctrine and a practice specific to them, and no one 
else should enjoy of its features other than them, and no one else should 
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enjoy its features other than them. Algeria, Egypt and Gaza are witness to 
that.180 
The current ideological framing practices of AQC are heavily centered on the 
actions of the far enemy. This has been central to the organization since its inception and 
capitalizes on strong dislike of U.S. foreign policy in MENA. While many jihadi groups 
publicly admonish the United States and even call for attacks against it, AQC is unique in 
that it focuses so much of its rhetoric against the far enemy even in light of all regional 
turmoil, which perhaps is of more pressing concern for the Muslim people. As discussed 
above, al-Zawahiri is still calling for strikes against the far enemy and has even advised 
his audience in a recent interview to “capture Westerners…especially the Americans as 
much as they can, to exchange them for their captives.”181 It is important to note that 
despite the high levels anti-American rhetoric, AQC is not currently focusing solely on 
striking the far enemy. This may be partly due to the fact the central organization is 
unable to organize and mount a large scale attacks or perhaps the leadership is attempting 
to capitalize on the popularity of more regionally focused jihadi movements in Syria and 
Iraq. 
The continuing violence in Syria has been another major theme in all of AQC’s 
messaging in the post Arab Spring environment. The topic of the far enemy is still a 
major talking point but al-Zawahiri has recognized the tremendous opportunity to recruit 
foreign fighters in the popular jihad against the al-Assad regime. Recent estimates place 
the number of foreign fighters in Syria at around 16,000.182 Syria presents a relatively 
easy destination for would-be jihadists to travel to and the plethora of established militant 
organizations make assimilation into the jihad a simple matter in comparison to planning 
elaborate attacks against the far enemy for example. AQC must also realize that if it is to 
compete with rival jihadi groups it must establish a strong presence in this conflict in 
order to be able to take credit should the regime fall. 
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AQC’s Syrian affiliate the al-Nusra Front is currently one of the largest jihadi 
groups engaged in the battle against the al-Assad regime. Al-Zawahiri and other 
prominent al-Qaeda ideologues have increasingly devoted their energies to encouraging 
Muslims to join this organization. In a statement released in September 2012 al-Zawahiri 
urged Muslims to support “the mujahideen and doing the call to arms to them wherever 
they are, especially in Iraq and Syria. By supporting the mujahideen, the strength of the 
jihadi Ummah increases and the Ummah will learn the lost obligation from which its 
enemies had driven it away.”183 Statements like this are representative of AQC’s 
adoption of focusing on regional conflicts since the events of the Arab Spring. The 
turmoil that has pervaded in the region since the popular revolutions has opened up a new 
battle space for the jihad, and these campaigns, unlike those directed at strong western 
targets, have the potential to be won. 
Before his death, AQC ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi echoed al-Zawahiri’s 
sentiments for the call to Jihad in Syria. In a recorded message from June 2012, he stated: 
From here we call upon our Muslim brothers and our mujahedeen brothers 
in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey to rise to help their brothers and to sacrifice 
themselves for them in order to stop the bloodshed of the weak, to 
preserve the honor of the free women, and to sacrifice everything that is 
precious and dear for that in terms of money and lives, and to consider 
every sacrifice to be cheap in return for defending them.184 
With no end in sight to the civil war in Syria it is likely AQC will continue to urge 
its audience to join the jihad in the Levant. The popularity and relative ease of joining the 
battle makes it an enticing proposition for jihadists. Should the situation in Syria ever be 
resolved, or if the different factions come to an immovable stalemate it will be important 
to determine whether AQC shifts the emphasis of its messaging back to the far enemy. 
While it is true al-Zawahiri is still championing the battle against the United States and 
its allies, he clearly believes that the fight in Syria is of equal if not greater importance at 
the moment. 
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In many of its public messages after the Arab Spring, AQC has stressed the 
importance of properly applying Sharia in the jihadi movement. These messages appear 
to be an attempt to curb unnecessarily violent behavior by jihadists that can turn public 
sentiment against the movement. Al-Zawahiri devotes large amounts of time in his public 
proclamations informing his audience that indiscriminate violence, the killing of innocent 
people, and any other behavior that falls outside divine law is forbidden. In a public 
statement released in April 2014 al-Zawahiri stated; “Jihad is like any other human 
activity in that errors occur in it…Do not imagine that it could be said that whoever 
incites for jihad is also the commander and thus he bears responsibility for the mistakes 
of the mujahideen in violation of Shariah.”185 Al-Zawahiri frequently implores those 
engaged in the jihad to act responsibly and in accordance with Sharia law. Public 
perception is key to gaining financial aid, recruits, and broader support in the Muslim 
world. If the jihadi movement is seen as a morally corrupt group of criminals that kill 
innocent people, then its religious credibility and virtue can be called into question. 
al-Zawahiri also frequently discusses the importance of applying Sharia when 
planning martyrdom operations. In a taped interview in 2014, he stated: 
Martyrdom-seeking operations are like any other method that can be 
misused…We must be concerned for the sanctities and the blood that the 
Shariah made inviolable, in addition to the duty of determining the 
advantages and disadvantages when planning such operations, so that the 
media of the enemies does not exploit them to make the Ummah adverse 
to the mujahideen. This deviation must be resisted, by promoting virtue 
and prohibiting vice, and forming a public opinion between the Muslims 
and the mujahideen that denounces these deviations. If these errors took 
place then it is required to denounce them, and whoever did them must 
apologize and face the Shariah consequences.186 
In the framing contest with competing Jihadi groups, al-Zawahiri is attempting to 
set AQC apart as the virtuous and rightly guided organization. As stated above, the most 
effective framing strategies involve the “exaltation” and “credentialing” of ones own 
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group and the “vilification” and “discrediting” of ones opponent.187 AQC consciously 
separated its ties with ISIS in February of 2014 because it viewed the group as 
detrimental to its cause.188 The execution of innocent Muslim civilians and high levels of 
sectarian violence fell outside the parameters of AQC’s interpretation of Sharia. It can 
also be argued that AQC decided to break ties due to ISIS announcing that it had 
incorporated al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate al-Nusra Front into its own organization without 
consulting al-Zawahiri beforehand.189 
Regardless of the rationale, the AQC leadership has determined that it cannot be 
affiliated with a group that acts on its own volition and commits acts that do not fall 
within Sharia law. Although taking this moral high ground may give AQC an edge in the 
ideological battleground, it runs the very real risk of losing credibility if its affiliated 
groups do not behave according to its guidance. If al-Nusra front in Syria or AQAP in 
Yemen commit a violent act that contradicts al-Zawahiri’s public decrees it is possible 
that AQC will be viewed as a weak organization that does not have any real control over 
its affiliate groups. AQC is no longer able to forcibly keep its offshoots in line with its 
policies and must rely on these groups to willingly acquiesce to their parent organization. 
Should a group not comply with AQC’s demands the only recourse al-Zawahiri has is to 
withdraw support and deny them the al-Qaeda brand. 
The final major topic that AQC has been discussing in its recent public messaging 
is the need to establish new al-Qaeda affiliates throughout the region. On September 3, 
2014 Ayaman al-Zawahiri announced the establishment of al Qaeda in the Indian 
Subcontinent (AQIS).190 Al-Zawahiri claimed that AQC was able to broker an alliance 
between disparate groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Baluchistan that will 
actively target government agents aligned against the ummah.191 It may seem 
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counterintuitive to seek expansion of the al-Qaeda organization considering the current 
debilitated state of the central command but this announcement must be understood 
through the current context of the jihadi movement. ISIS has surpassed al-Qaeda in terms 
of number of recruits, popularity, and media exposure. AQC is a peripheral organization 
and is no longer the beneficiary of sizable financial donations and recruits. 
Taking this into account it is not surprising that al-Zawahiri is seeking to 
demonstrate that al-Qaeda is still a valid global brand and the AQC is still capable of 
brokering high-level alliances. This also paints ISIS as an organization that is regionally 
focused and not capable of operating on an international stage. Many analysts have 
viewed the establishment of AQIS as a desperate maneuver to stay relevant in light of the 
rapid ascendency of ISIS.192 A second explanation analysts have offered is that AQC is 
attempting to dissuade the Pakistani government from cracking down on various jihadist 
groups in the region.193 Pakistan has become one of the last safe havens for AQC but at 
any point the Pakistani government could step up its anti-terror campaign against the 
group. A display of unity between multiple regional jihadi groups could be a strong 
deterrent against increased attacks against the jihadists. Whether AQIS becomes a 
dangerous global actor or simply an administrative alignment of numerous groups with 
competing agendas is not yet known. AQIS claimed responsibility for the attempted 
highjacking of a Pakistani Navy Frigate in September 2014 but have not yet successfully 
carried out any major attacks against regional governments or western states.194 
Through the analysis of AQC’s public statements since the events of the Arab 
Spring, this chapter has demonstrated that al-Qaeda’s central leadership has made subtle 
changes to their ideological messaging. AQC is primarily focused on encouraging ‘lone 
wolf’ attacks against the far enemy, unifying Muslim people, applying sharia in the 
global jihad, recruiting foreign fighters in Syria, and establishing new affiliates in the 
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region. Although al-Zawahiri routinely discusses a multitude of other issues it is the 
above-mentioned topics that currently pervade in his public announcements. 
Arguably AQC no longer has the strength or popularity to significantly persuade 
its audience to adhere to its ideological narrative. New groups such as ISIS have eclipsed 
AQC on the world stage and al-Qaeda’s affiliate organizations have little incentive other 
than retaining the al-Qaeda brand to remain loyal to the central organization. With that 
said, AQC is still operating, attempting to establish new affiliates, encouraging small 
scale attacks against the far enemy, and broadcasting its violent ideology to a broad 
audience. Time will tell if the organization can recover and reach the strength it held in 
the pre-9-11 world, but it remains vitally important to international security to monitor 
AQC’s public statements and track shifts in its ideological narrative. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
During its history the al-Qaeda organization has gone through tremendous 
structural change. From its fledgling beginning in the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan 
War to its meteoric rise to the most powerful global jihadi group in the world, al-Qaeda’s 
influence and reach has gone through many ups and downs. The organization has been 
incredibly adaptive to the ever-changing strategic environment and considering that most 
terrorist organization have a maximum life span of approximately fourteen years, al-
Qaeda has proven its resilience as it closes out its third decade of existence.195 Despite its 
longevity, the modern incarnation of AQC is not the formidable terrorist group that was 
once able to finance and plan complex attacks against western targets. Today, AQC is the 
largely ceremonial mouthpiece for a disparate collection of affiliate organizations 
scattered around the Middle East and parts of North and West Africa.196 While the 
support structures, political opportunities, and the ability to mobilize resources have 
largely dissipated for AQC, its ideology and ability to disseminate its message is still 
largely intact. 
The importance of maintaining a relevant ideology and consistent message 
framing practices cannot be overstated in the case of AQC. FBI Director Robert Muller 
argues that AQC’s command structure, resources, and safe havens have been decimated 
since the beginning of the United States’ anti-terror campaign.197 Thousands of al-Qaeda 
operatives have been killed and the central leadership has been pushed into deep hiding 
where they are unable to coordinate and finance complex attacks.198 In today’s 
environment, AQC’s ideology and ability to promulgate its message is arguably its most 
important weapon. Financial constraints and the inability to plan future jihadist 
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operations have little bearing on AQC’s influence or its ability to encourage affiliate 
organizations and homegrown terrorists.199 This thesis has argued that AQC has 
acknowledged its reduced ability to mount complex assaults and has instead looked to 
encourage “lone wolf” attacks that require no central leadership, financing, or training.200 
Broadly speaking, lone individuals and independent al-Qaeda affiliates no longer rely on 
their parent organization for anything other than the al-Qaeda brand and ideological 
messaging. AQC may still view itself as a powerful organization capable of brokering 
alliances but there is scarce evidence that the groups core leadership holds the same 
influence that it once did under the leadership of Osama bin Laden.201 
The first hypothesis posed in this thesis was that the events of the Arab Spring 
had minimal bearing on the ideological framing practices of al-Qaeda. The data compiled 
in this thesis demonstrates that his assertion is false. In its infancy AQC largely 
maintained consistent framing practices but as the groups positioned weakened it 
frequently adapted its message when there where shifts in the strategic environment. This 
trend is especially apparent during the events of the Arab Spring when AQC ideologues 
struggled to fit their ideology into the rapidly shifting political setting. In general, AQC 
has remained true to its founding principles but routinely exploit new openings in the 
political environment when it appears beneficial to its goals and ultimate survival. AQC 
was severely weakened after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 but it 
recovered much of its stature after establishing a powerful al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. 
Without exerting a great amount of central control over AQI, bin Laden used his stature 
as the worlds leading jihadist to encourage thousands of Iraqi and foreign fighters to join 
the AQ affiliate in Iraq and violently oppose the U.S. occupation and democratic 
transition.202 Prioritizing attacks against U.S.-backed regional governments and military 
forces did not fit the traditional al-Qaeda model of defeating the far enemy first, but AQC 
realized that the chaos consuming Iraq after the U.S. invasion was a new opportunity to 
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exploit. For many years throughout the Iraq War AQC adapted its framing practices to 
emphasize the importance of expelling crusader forces from Muslim lands and urging the 
ummah to abandon the call for democratic transition.203 AQC proved that even from a 
structurally weakened position it could maintain its relevance by channeling the energies 
of radical Islamists into its strategic mission. 
As discussed previously in this thesis, AQC also attempted to adapt its framing 
strategy when the Arab Spring uprisings began in 2011 but the public messages seemed 
to be out of step with the desires of millions of Muslims clamoring for democratic 
elections. AQC began vilifying the majority of citizens in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen 
who marched to the polls in large numbers to usher in a new era of popularly elected 
representation. The autocratic rulers that AQC detested had been removed but not by its 
organizations hand, and the ummah that it professed to represent did not appear to have 
any interest in establishing an Islamic state. Furthermore, AQC failed to provide any 
coherent model of how such a transition should take place. Al-Qaeda’s framing strategy 
had always been clear on the methods for removing corrupt dictators but there was a 
glaring paucity of practical plans for constructing a completely new form of government. 
The early stages of the Arab Spring, when many Muslims had a genuine belief that 
change was possible, exposed the frailty in al-Qaeda’s ideology more than any other 
period in the group’s history. Had the revolutions that spread across MENA in the 
beginning of 2011 led to lasting democratic transition and improved quality of life, it is 
possible that AQC’s ideology could have disappeared into the annals of history, but this 
scenario never transpired. With the possible exception of Tunisia, the revolutions did not 
lead to peaceful democratic elections, and in the case of Syria, the uprisings have spurred 
a violent civil war that has opened fertile new ground for jihadist groups. 
The second hypothesis posed in this thesis was that the current violence and 
instability resulting from the events of the Arab Spring has shifted global jihadi focus to 
regional and domestic targets. The data compiled in this thesis supports this assertion. 
Even before the violent fall out from the Arab Spring, AQC routinely focused its rhetoric 
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towards regional targets like the democratically elected governments in post-war Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In addition to AQC’s ideological framing shifts that focus on the near 
enemy, its affiliate organizations are almost all exclusively pursuing domestic targets as 
well. Today AQC is once again adapting its framing strategy to exploit the turmoil 
gripping Syria and Iraq. The popularity of the civil war in this region has attracted 
thousands of foreign fighters, and the ease of entry into the Syrian borders, proliferation 
of weapons, and absence of strong governance make it a relatively open destination for 
radical Islamists.204 Ayman al-Zawahiri has made repeated public calls for Muslims to 
join al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, the al-Nusra Front, and this group remains one of the 
largest and most active organizations operating in Syria today.205  
The final hypothesis posed in this thesis was that rival jihadi groups with 
conflicting objectives and strategies have weakened AQC. The data compiled in this 
thesis supports this assertion. Even before the rise of ISIS, AQC’s position as the world’s 
preeminent jihadist organization was tenuous. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership had been 
isolated and marginalized and they had little control over their numerous affiliate 
organizations. AQC has been further weakened by its ideological and physical struggle 
with ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are also losing potential recruits 
and funding due to the relative popularity of ISIS. ISIS has overshadowed AQC and the 
al-Nusra Front in the past year but AQC continue to tailor its public messaging to 
compete with its rival group. Al-Zawahiri has repeatedly called for an end to the 
widespread sectarian violence being perpetrated by ISIS and has urged unity in the fight 
against the apostate regimes and their western backers.206 The al-Nusra front has echoed 
its parent organization’s sentiments and has publicly urged cooperation between all 
Muslims. It claims to support a gradual approach to the establishment of an Islamic State 
and are providing a powerful antithesis to the uncompromising and violent methods of 
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ISIS.207 In a battle for recruits, resources, and group survival, AQC is attempting to 
frame its organization as a more sensible alternative to its rival ISIS. The framing 
competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS is still ongoing but current trends demonstrate 
that the Islamic State’s message is resonating more deeply with potential recruits.  
This thesis has argued that AQC has only been able to survive due to its ability to 
adapt to a rapidly changing strategic environment by maintaining a malleable ideology, 
restructuring the organization’s hierarchy, and constantly expanding its affiliates. Out of 
necessity al-Qaeda has transformed into a fractured network of loosely aligned groups 
that do not rely on instructions or funding from the central leadership. AQC provides an 
ideological narrative and a recognizable brand name that extremist groups use to build 
their own credentials and attract new recruits. AQC has been denied political 
opportunities and the ability to mobilize resources but it has successfully maintained a 
relevant ideology that is frequently tailored to exploit new opportunities. The Arab 
Spring presented AQC with previously unseen challenges but the group has survived and 
perhaps even been vindicated in its assertion that democratic transition is not possible 
while Muslim states continue to receive backing from the far enemy. AQC is by no 
means in a position of power however. Its core leadership is aging and becoming 
increasingly isolated from the current jihadi battlegrounds. It is imperative that studies on 
al-Qaeda framing strategies continue, especially as leadership roles shift from members 
who came to prominence in the Soviet-Afghan War to a younger generation of fighters. 
Al-Qaeda’s numerous affiliates have primarily gained battlefield experience engaging in 
local struggles and it is conceivable that should one of these group’s leaders assume the 
position of AQC’s ideological leader that his priorities may diverge significantly from his 
predecessor’s. AQC remains a major security threat and the study of the group’s 
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